Introduction and Motivation
Developing a corporate code of ethics amounts to something like playing the role of a "constitution designer" on small scale. It is an experiment of rational decision about the general and abstract norms that have to work as constitutional constraints on a "corporate actor" -i.e. a firm seen as a microconstitutional order (Coleman 1990 , Vanberg 1992 . Codes of ethics in fact regulate claims and rights that several stakeholders may advance toward the organisation, so that, when these claims are legitimate by the institution of a code of ethics, who govern the firm must respond and to be accountable for them.
According to empirical surveys in 1980 only 8% of American largest companies (the Fortune 1000 list of industrial and service corporations) had a code of ethics. Afterward the phenomenon has been very fast growing in the US. According to surveys performed in 1985/86 and 1990/92 on the Fortune's first 1000 US firms, those endowed with a code of ethics were respectively 77% and 93%. Although it is less extensive, nevertheless the phenomenon is clearly recognisable also in Europe. A research performed in 1988 -the CEOs of the 600 largest industrial companies in RFT, GB and France was asked to answer a questionnaire and the level of acceptance was around 30% -concludes that at that time code of ethics was present in 51% and 41% of the RFT and GB companies respectively. The very fast development of the filed of business ethics in Europe in the last decade allows us to say that these levels has certainly grown in the meantime. Moreover it seems clear that the different levels and timing of the spreading process of code of ethics throughout US and European companies can be correlated to the different levels of State provisions and legally enforced social protections of the workers and the other stakeholders and to the trends of liberalisation and privatisation of various national economies, which is obviously related to the empowerment of business in society. Best structured code s of ethics both in US and Europe clearly reflect the idea of corporate responsibility towards all the firm's stakeholders, and are organised into separate chapters defining the corporate fiduciary duties towards shareholders, customers, employees, suppliers, government agencies, competitors, local communities, political representatives etc.
Corporations allocate to they corporate governance structures authority over a large part of the transactions they carry out, both regulated by (incomplete) labour contracts or by (incomplete) arm's length contract with suppliers, customers, partners, capital lending organisations. These contracts are incomplete per se, but as the occurrence of unforeseen contingencies is anticipated, they are completed by residual rights of control allocating discretion upon ex ante non-contractible decisions to one party in the contract. Ownership and control structures respond to a need of minimising some transaction costs. But they also admit the overreaching risk of abuse of authority. This is true in particular when many parties involved in transactions make specific investments and face sunk costs. As a consequence corporations tend to be surrounded by the fear of abusing their power and by distrust on the part of those stakeholders that in principle might interact with them in the perspective of mutual gain. If this distrust does not end up with the collapse of these economic institutions, which on the contrary are overwhelming in the contemporary economies, it must be due to norms and institutions other than residual rights of control, which constrain their abuse. Both empirical investigation and theoretical deduction from the theory of firm suggest that corporations need systems of self-regulatory norms of behaviour like codes of ethics exactly because of the 'abuse of authority ' problem (Sacconi 2000) .
Let me state three main requirements for a code of ethics can play the role of a rational constraint on the abuse of authority:
a)
It must reflect a reasonable and acceptable agreement amongst the corporate stakeholders about how the surplus produced by their joint co-operation will be shared;
b) It must work as a self-enforcing social norm, as it should not be meant as a legal expropriation of the residual rights of control seen as a (second best) efficient economic institution;
c) It must answer the question how who holds authority in the firm may undertake commitments over events and situations that cannot be ex ante contractible or describable within contracts or detailed regulation. Such situations make contracts incomplete in the very sense that parties a priori do not even have an idea of the possible states that should be used in order to condition obligation or concrete commitment. Under such situations commitments tend to be empty, simply because they are mute regarding those states that were ex ante unknown.
Codes of ethics can satisfy these requirements because:
I. They incorporate the ideal of a social contract amongst all the essential stakeholder of the firm (not only the shareholders), which opens the route to identifying acceptable term of cooperation in the view of a hypothetical agreement amongst all the stakeholders.
II.
As ethical norms, codes of ethics are meant to be self-enforcing. Norms of morality are complied with only because they are be able to generate spontaneous adhesion or positive incentives in terms of reputation and social acceptation, so that they typically do not ask for an heavy legal enforcement.
III.
They are sets of general and abstract principles, accompanied by rules of interpretation and precautionary standard of behaviour that are carried out when the interpreter recognises that a concrete -even if ex ante unforeseen-contingency falls within the domain of the general principle.
General abstract principles are wider than detailed regulation. They are universalisable, that is extensible to any (even if) unforeseen situations, which only might share or resemble to a general characteristic or pattern of the principles itself. In order to recognise that a situation belongs to the domain of a general principle we do not need a complete description of it. Moreover, how a general principle extends to unforeseen contingencies is a matter of grade, not of yes or not. Thus, universality, abstractness and generality implies the "wideness of application VS vagueness" tradeoff.
The first two points are quite naturally amenable to a game theoretical analysis. Cooperative bargaining games provide the natural theoretical tool for understanding the social contract amongst the stakeholders of the firm, who are essential to the joint production of a surplus (Harsanyi 1977 , Brock 1979 , Gauthier 1986 , Binmore 1991 , Sacconi 1999 . Moreover, non cooperative game theory provides games of reputation as the natural way of modelling codes of ethics as social norms that are be put in practice only because they induce endogenous incentive to compliance, as they satisfy the conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium (Binmore 1991 , Sacconi 2000 . Requiring endogenous incentives to comply with codes of ethics suggests modelling them in terms of games of reputationswhere quite naturally the code provides the basis for defining the players' types in a game of incomplete information.
However, the third point -how undertaking significant commitments under unforeseen contingencies -constitutes a serious challenge to current game theoretical modelling, as David Kreps put forward in his pioneeristic contribution on "Corporate culture and economic theory" (Kreps 1990) . Our understanding of incomplete knowledge -the label under which this point should be analysed -must go further than treatments where unforeseen contingencies are seen as a sort of statistical uncertainty over a qualified subset of states amenable to standard Bayesian modelling (Tirole 1999 , Felli, Anderlini 2000 , Al -Najjar, Anderlini, Felli 2000 . What is needed are models of rational decision under situation such that (i) players are aware of the possibility of generic unforeseen contingencies (because of the limitation of their linguistic resources), but (ii) they are also ex ante unable to figure out each of them. Thus the model of player's reasoning must not assume that the complete and exhaustive set of the possible states of the world is already resident in the back of his mind.
This paper elaborates on a first, very tentative , modelling of unforeseen contingencies I gave in a previous book (Sacconi 2000) in terms of fuzzy sets theory (Zadeh 1965 , Zimmerman 1991 . Our incomplete knowledge about unforeseen contingencies is captured by defining some events as fuzzy subsets of the set of unforeseen states of the world -which are states that admit ex post only an incomplete and vague description in terms of the concepts formulated in our ex ante language. Such events correspond to terms of the language the players were able to use before coming to learn about the unforeseen states. By these terms we define the domain of general abstract norms, i.e. abstract descriptive characteristics that have to be satisfied in order a moral principle may be applied. Due to their generality, abstractness and universalisability, these terms admit to be at least in part satisfied by many situation, even though these don't share many details that we ex ante used to describe as belonging to their domain.
The const of their all-encompassing nature is vagueness. Membership into the set defining the domain of a general, abstract, principle of ethics is a matter of degree and this opens the route to defining domains of general norms as fuzzy sets of unforeseen states of the world. This is only the first step, however. Then we have to model the reasoning the pl ayers are able to perform given this incomplete (vague) base of knowledge, by using the code of ethics as a deliberative procedure for jumping from vague premises to what it has to be done in any unforeseen contingency. It is then suggested a second tentative modelling of players' inferences in the terms of the logic of default reasoning (Reiter 1980 , Ginsberg 1987 . The intuition is that in many normative situation, given incomplete knowledge that does not allow refuting that the "normal course" of things does in fact hold, we extend our belief that the "normal course" does in fact hold also to the incompletely known situation, even if this belief is defeasible and as a whole the beliefs system results to be non monotonic. By this way I formalise the inference players are able to perform within the code of ethics in order to conclude which actions are permissible and which are forbidden under any unforeseen contingency. As a consequence I can define the commitments a player conforming to the code is expected to carry out. This allows replicating within the new context some of the well-known results in the theory of games of reputation Levine 1989, 1991) . Thus, our elaboration on the logical structure of a code of ethics can be seen as the necessary preparatory step for applying standard results in the theory of games of reputation to the field of organisational decision-making under unforeseen contingencies
The Hierarchical Transaction as a Game
In order to explain how a set of general and abstract principles and norms -call it a code of ethicsmay complete the holes of an incomplete contract (Coleman 1992) , we need to define the context of strategic interaction under which a transaction takes place between two or more parties (the players).
Because the contract is incomplete, some decision variables contingent upon unforeseen events are exante un-contractible. Thus, them are left under control of some party in the ex-post perspective -that is when the acceptance of the contract is over and some important decisions within the relationship will have already been taken. Such party will exploit them in the resulting ex-post bargaining in order to renegotiate the incomplete contract. Because this may generate transaction costs and inefficiency, an institutional design of the residual right of control over these ex ante un-contractible decisions variable is in order. The resulting situation is one where some transaction occurs under an incomplete contract cum residual rights of control (authority) over the ex ante un-contractible decisions allocated to one of the parties in the contract. This is what we call a hierarchical transaction (Williamson 1986 , Grossman, Hart 1986 , Hart, Moore 1988 , Kreps 1990 . A Game theoretical model of the hierarchical transaction is our starting point.
A Hierarchical Transaction
Consider two parties who may undergo to a contract in order to carry out a hierarchical transaction.
Party A may enter or not into a relationship of dependency with a second player B. This means that, when A has entered the relationship with B, he will in fact accept to perform some ex-ante unspecified task that B will discretionarily order him to carry out later on, against some pre-established payments. If A chooses 'enter', thus, a relationship of authority is established. If 'not' is chosen the relationship is ended. In the course of the relationship between A and B unforeseen events can arise. They render the explicit contract, on the basis of which A decides to enter into a dependent relationship with B, 'mute'. The contract is 'mute' because it cannot contain explicit and concrete provisos contingent on the occurrence of the unforeseen events. This is exactly why the contract inherently builds up an authority relationship: B will be enabled to decide ex post discretionarily what to command A to perform, without being any specific decision automatically sorted out by the ex-ante established provisos of the contract. But now A becomes afraid that B will abuse of his authority. Moreover he realizes that an abuse, if it were to come, would not be easily checked on the basis of any existing contractual rules or provisos. The problem is: why A should 'trust' B and 'enter'? 
The Game in Extended Form
The hierarchical transaction is depicted in fig. 1 as a game in extensive form. Player A (in short 'A') moves first. A has to choose out of a decision-set containing 'entering' (e) or 'not entering' (non-e) into an authority relationship with player B (in short 'B'). By choosing e A surrenders to B the right to decide at a later moment in the game one action within the set a = {a*, a C }. By choosing non-e the game is ended. If A chooses to enter, he incurs a specific investment I A with a fixed sunk cost c(I A ) . If A enters, as a consequence B also incur s a specific investment I B , with fixed sunk cost c(I B ). Notice that in order to keep things simple we do not take these investments as separate strategic decisions within the game. They are assumed as the simple mechanical consequence of the only strategically relevant A's choice to enter.
However they shape the game in terms of the payoff-consequences of the strategic decisions (e or not-e , a* or a C ) the players undertake. In fact, specificity of investments is meant to signify that
where r is the net benefit of any action a, given the investment I i , when it is taken outside the relationship between A and B and V(e,a,I i ) is the benefit of the action a ordered by B and carried out by A, given I i . That is, with respect to any other transaction outside the A and B's relationship, there is a surplus attached to completing the transaction through the couple of actions (e,a) within the relationship between A and B after the investment I i as been made. The global amount of wealth created by transacting between them, after the specific investment has been made, is higher than what could come out of transactions with any agent outside the relation. Taking the utility function of the players linear in the money, this would also be true if measured in terms of each player's payoff functions. Moreover we assume that the relationship between A and B is symmetrically cooperative, in the sense that the investments of both of them contribute additional value to the surplus:
S = V(e,a,I A , I B ) -c(I A , I B ) > V(e,a,I i ) -c(I i ),
where I i is the investment of A or B but not both. If A enter, he will receives a fixed salary
where p is a constant. We assume that A's fixed salary covers the cost of A's specific investment but
possibly not the cost of the variable levels of effort that are requested by the two actions that B can ask A to perform contingent over what may occur during the game.
At move two in the game tree Nature chooses a state of the world out of two sets W and Ω. States in W are defined as follows: each w i ∈W is one of the alternative, jointly exhaustive, possible descriptions of the world, describable by a given set of linguistic resources L. L is a formal language made up of -N predicative letters P 1 ,…, P n , -M variables x 1 ,...,x m , -N individual constants q 1 ,...,q n , -The usual logical connectives (&, ∨, ¬, ⇒)
-All the formulae that can be generated by operating with the connectives and the rules of inference.
Formally said, each possible world w i is one of the maximal sets of (well formed) formulae of L, that is one set of formulae that cannot be increased by any formula without introducing a contradiction in the conjunction of the formulae belonging to it. To exemplify, given that we have M free variables and N predicative letters, one state w i will first consist, for each free variable, of the conjoint affirmation of as many of the N predicates as it doesn't imply a contradiction, and second of the conjunction of all of them over the set of M variables. Take U to be the domain of interpretation of the language L. Each state of the world w i made up of one possible maximal set of terms in L, can be seen as one possible way of describing, as completely as possible by means of L's linguistic resources, any object belonging to U. It is an alternative description to any other state w j because for at least one variable, interpretable in the domain U, w i affirms a predicate which is negated by other states w j . To say differently, any state w i is an alternative description of U within L. Within this framework we can define an event E that a given object has a certain property j as the subset of possible states such that each of these states, as expressed in L, affirms the predicate P j about the individual variable x i corresponding to the given object in U.
Let me now introduce the less conventional assumption that before playing the game players are aware that the set of possible states included in W may be 'incomplete'. By this I mean that they are aware that the language L is limited and some properties could eventually be exemplified by events that may occur, which cannot be exactly described by predicates included in L. Thus, the domain U will be 'completely' described by the states in W only relatively to what may be expressed through the resources of L. In general, however, the domain U will contain some properties that the language L will not completely account for, so that any w i will not affirm nor negate these properties. However, let assume that the players are aware of that, but that they are not even able ex ante to say which properties these are nor even to imagine them. This means that the players are aware that, beyond the set W, there also may exist a set Ω of ex ante unspecified and undermined states, whose elements contain some properties that are incompletely describable in terms of the existing language L. For any ω i ∈Ω players will be ex post able to find out some free variable, interpretable in U, such that they cannot exactly say whether some predicate in L is true or false for it. The reason is that predicates in L are inadequate for describing the unexpected proprieties of the state ω i , and this authorize us to call it an 'unforeseen state of the world'.
Eventually they will enrich their language by new terms. But, as far as the current linguistic resources are concerned, players cannot find in L predicates that describe exactly what happens under ω i .
While in the context of W an event E is defined as the subset of all the states w i ∈W in which a certain property is definitely true, on the contrary in the case of the elements of Ω an event E may be defined as the subset of those states ω i ∈Ω in which the given property can be affirmed only up to some degree.
Being able to hold expectations only about events that they are able to formulate in L, there are not precise expectations on unforeseen events. Unforeseen events are things we cannot speak about directly within L. We may infer they existence from the fact that some ex ante known events appear with some vagueness under states in Ω.
We are now able to define the state-set Ω. To find out the effective payoffs, it is necessary to go back to the states of the world on which they depend. Assume that for every w i it is known by the players that:
•specific investments made by A and B are jointly indispe nsable to the production of the maximum surplus, and the resulting cooperative return is superadditive, that is V(e,a,I A , I B ) ≥ V(e,a, I i ), for i = A,B
V(e,a,I A , I B ) ≥ V(e,a,I A ) + V(e,a,I B ) •parties make their specific investments I i without free riding one another.
Next assume that there are three possible descriptions of "maximum return" R (high, medium and low) conditional on some characteristics of the states
To say it differently, the state space W is partitioned in three events as far as maximum return is concerned. Similarly, assume that each action a may produce three possible levels of effort's cost (high, medium and low) contingent on some characteristics of the states.
As above , the state space W is partitioned in three elements (events) as far as effort's cost is concerned. In sum, the language of our theory is able of describing nine states of the world by multiplication of the two set of events:
Because we do not want to concentrate here on the intrinsic vagueness of qualitative term as 'high', 'medium' and 'low', whereas we will be concerned in the next section with modelling vagueness introduced by unforeseen states of the world, we take some cardinal values as representative of the three classes. Take for example
The additional compensation C is a two -valued variable conditional on player's A action. I take it to be
Last, let the constants be
Payoffs can be then calculated according to the form of the utility functions given above, considering that nine states may occur under the choice of both actions a C and a* (in fig.1 non-e. Assume for simplicity that the burden o A + has nearly probability one. Contingent upon the states of the world now considered, the game is the Game of Trust (a sequential unilateral variant of the classic PD game): the only feasible outcome is the sub-optimal Nash equilibrium (non-e, a*). In the remaining cases A's best reply is always e, with the Nash equilibrium outcome (e, a*).
The Game Under Unforeseen Contingencies
The aim of this section is to consider the interaction between the two players when Nature selects a state from the state-space Ω. We show that, if the game is meant as one-shot, the solution is not only ex ante, but also ex post undetermined and ambiguous. In order to see that, first ask "what do the players know about the game under Ω?" Ex ante (before Nature makes its choice) independently of the state ω i chosen, they know that a generic return Q, described in terms of monetary gains, will follow (without loss of generality we can also assume that players know that Q may take its values within a specified monetary interval [0, n] , where n is a finite integer number.) Moreover a generic action, in terms of a number Z of hours to be worked, will be chosen by player B (as before, we may assume that players know that Z lies within a definite time interval [0, m] , where again m is a finite integer number.)
At the same time they are aware that, if nature selects any state ω i out of Ω, this will imply the occurrence of events that they are not able to specify ex ante. In term of what they are able to express within the existing language, in each state ω i there will be ambiguity about:
The joint nature of the return: Is it still true that Q is the output of the joint cooperation of both players carried out through their simultaneous specific investments and actions (as it was true under states belonging to W)?
II.
The size of the cooperative benefit: How much, if any, of the observable Q could be attributed to such investments and how much could be due to exogenous change of the environment? (The employee could result not being necessary to the realization of surplus or, on the other hand, B may become superfluous.)
III.
The existence of externality: Are specific investments I A and I B in effect the fruits of independent decisions, or some of the players free rides the other's investment?
IV. contributions to the production of the surplus, whether each of them has effectively made a specific investment, whether the investment made by one free rides the other, and moreover how costly any action asked by B to A is in terms of A's effort costs. Understandably this will influence the players' incentives (Tirole 1999) . This translates in the ambiguity of the two basic variables R and o A needed for specifying the players' payoff functions.
The size of the burden of B's orders to

Solution Theory: Social Contract and the Ethical Code
Now, take the perspective of a repeated game of reputation amongst a long-run player B and an infinite series of short-run players taking in turn the role of player A. At each repetition the stage-game just defined in the sections above will be played again and again (Kreps 1990 , Fudenberg and Levine 1989 o A+ (high effort-costs), the sub-optimal outcome (non-e,a*) is avoided nevertheless.
• Under the case Ω: reputation also supports rational "entrance" by player B under the occurrence of the unforeseen states ω i .
The second requirement is of course the most demanding. The point is that a commitment is normally understood as a conditional strategy, which can be announced in advance to any play of the game, stating which of the B's actions will be selected contingently on the occurrence of any possible world. But there is no way for B to announce a commitment conditional on unforeseen states of the world, as he cannot describe the concrete conditions under which a particular action will be undertaken. This problem could be by-passed by adopting the same action in all the unforeseen states whatsoever -but this would amount to an inefficient unconditional commitment.
The solution here suggested is resorting to the Constitutional Contract of the firm as expressed by two types of norms:
• Both types of norm are based on a unique abstract principle for solving games (i.e. a solution concept) that I identify with the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) for cooperative bargaining games (Nash 1950 , Harsanyi 1977 . For our game is non-cooperative, NBS is not the obvious solution concept to be used here. It must be understood as a normative principle which does not simply follow from the individual rationality assumptions for non-cooperative games, and is meant as a constitutional rule purposively ex ante deliberated in order to give shape to Player's B (the one in the position of authority)
commitments. Suppose the players are able to posit themselves under an ex ante hypothetical stand point -the Archimedean point (Gauthier 1986, Binmore 1991) -from which they agree on abstract principles that will regulate their hierarchical transactions in general. This is the hypothetical bargaining position from which they agree on the social contract of the firm. I assume that in such a hypothetical position they would recognize the NBS as the general abstract principle for solving whatever strategic interaction among them may involve the joint production of a surplus ( The players' payoffs are given by participation in the cooperative return, respectively uA(V(e,a,IA,IB)) = s + c uB(V(e,a,IA,IB)) = R − s − c Nash's Bargaining solution therefore requires that one action a∈a is chosen so that
The cooperative return is R = V(e,a,IA,IB) and the surplus net of the status quo is
Were c a continuous variable, the solution would be choosing c such that
Given that the possible values of c contingent on the action a are only two, it follows that for all the states from w5 to w9 the NBS is satisfied by the action a*. In states w1, w2, w3 NBS requires that ac be chosen. When Nash product is in tie under a* and ac, as it happens in w4 , I assume that action ac must be used (this amount to say that the constitutional contract is biased in favour of player A, who must be convinced to enter the relationship.)
An incomplete contract, with discretionary power being given to B, therefore consists of a simple function that permits action a*, provided that states of the world with respect to which it is explicitly prohibited do not occur:
0 if w i = w 1 , w 2 , w 3 ,w 4 f(a*|w i ) = 1 otherwise (that is for every other w i ∈W)
Leaving B free to act according to his best reply in cases other than w1, w2, w3,w4 , the contract of delegation ensures that the solution is always in line with NBS. This contractual rule may be employed to specify player's B conditional commitments. Compliance with them is observable in any wi state of the world. As a consequence, player A may rest on B's reputation effects related to his conformity to these commitments in order to trust B and enter.
The Role of 'Vague' Constitutional Principles
In the case of Ω it is not possible to calculate ex ante the NBS for each possible state of the world.
Why should a code of ethics succeed where the explicit contract fails? NBS is only introduced here as a general abstract concept of solution, like a constitutional principle without any concrete reference to the particular states under which the game is played. Rather than ex ante calculating the Nash product for each possible state, mere abstract characteristics are stated as descriptive pre-conditions for a game can be submitted to the NBS. These are displaying in the appropriate way (i) the existence of a cooperative surplus and (ii) a fair status quo meant as the costs the parties independently undergo for making their investments and actions. Ex post, when unforeseen contingencies will have been brought about, we will be able to see whether the occurred state satisfies the requirements asking for a NBS-constraint over player B's choice.
In fact, general principles, formulated in universal abstract terms of the current language L, are terms of reference both for ex ante foreseen and for ex ante unforeseen or simply 'new' states of the world. The form of reference is a membership function. Due to generality, universality and abstractness of the constitutional principles, any state of the world, even though unforeseen, belongs to the domain of a principle at least to some degree (between full membership and nil). Moreover the requirements on the appropriate membership functions can always be specified, both in the ex ante and ex post perspective, as they are not contingent upon the description of ex ante unforeseen contingencies. Thus, by means of its general principles, the code of ethics is never mute in relation to events, including events that are ex ante unforeseen.
There is of course an important price in terms of vagueness to be paid to this all encompassing property of general and abstract principles. Unforeseen events in particular introduce vagueness in the membership relationship. I take for granted, even if this can be not always the case, that we mostly are able to clearly adjudicate a state of the world to the domain of application of a general principle as far as this state can be completely described within the same language by which also the principle is formulated.
The hypothesis is that most vagueness is associated to unforeseen facts, because of the imprecision of the language L in ex post describing events that were ex ante unforeseen.
To state the point analytically, encode by P an abstract constitutional principle and by E the event 'the constitutional principle P is fulfilled'. The event E is equivalent to summing up all the descriptive features required to fulfil the principle. 3 The statement is that every unforeseen state can belong to the event E. Simply, this belonging must be defined in terms of vague membership. This allows for a fuzzy set modelling of unforeseen contingencies.
Take an ordinary set of objects Ω. Intuitively mean E as a fuzzy subset of Ω such that the elements of Ω are member to E up to a certain degree. Degrees are given by membership functions µ E (ω i ) with domain the set Ω and co-domain the real line [0,1]. Thus a fuzzy set E is the set of ordered pairs such that any element of the given reference set Ω is associated to the membership function assigning the degree up to which it shares the property referred to by the fuzzy set.
Consequently it may be written
Let the set Ω = {ω 1 , ω 2 ,…, ω n } be the state-space, i.e. the set of all the possible alternative descriptions of the state of the world and let P(Ω) be the power set of the subsets of Ω, which is usually meant to be the collection of all the possible events, meant as subsets of Ω. The bulk of our approach to unforeseen contingencies is the following proposition: Under this interpretation the elements of any fuzzy set E are meant as alternative descriptions of the state of the world, which are unforeseen ex ante and only partially describable ex post. An event E denotes the existence of an unforeseen contingency as it corresponds within Ω to properties that only vaguely can be traced back to the event E. As a result, when the state space consists of unforeseen states of the world, its power set (the set of events) consists of fuzzy sets, i.e. vague events. True, I do not characterise unforeseen states as such directly in fuzzy terms. What is properly modelled as fuzzy set are the events we are able to express in our exiting language, whose members are unforeseen states of the world. By understanding unforeseen states through their imperfect membership function into fuzzy sets, we capture the impact of their being ex ante unforeseen on the precision and completeness of their ex post description by means of the existing language. To say it differently, being ex ante unforeseen implies vagueness in the ex post description, due to the inadequacy of the ex ante language L.
We are now able to draw important conclusions about the availability of commitments in the repeated game played under unforeseen contingencies. Although the player is not ex ante in a position to describe the set Ω, he is nevertheless aware of its eventual existence. He cannot undertake commitments contingent upon concrete descriptions of elements in Ω, for these are unforeseen. But he can undertake commitments regarding the occurrence ex post of a certain membership relationship between any generic element of Ω and the set E. i.e about the degree up to which any generic ω i is a member of E. Notice that ex ante the player does not need any description of the particular ω i . He only needs to be aware that a generic ω i may be selected out of Ω, to know the set of conditions compounded in E, and to establish the requirement that if any generic ω i would belong to E at least up to some given degree, then the principle P (the NBS in our case) is to be carried out ex post. Thus B undertakes commitments on the basis of principles and criteria that can be understood in the same terms both ex ante and ex post. The occurrence of unforeseen contingencies no more creates any ambiguity and non-observability problem concerning compliance with them.
First Step in the Ethical Procedure of Deliberation: Vagueness of the Constitutional Principle
In this section I begin defining operationally the code of ethics as a procedure of deliberation able to decide for every state, included the unforeseen ω i ∈Ω, whether ex post a given action (for example a*) is permissible in the light of a constitutional principle established ex ante. It fits the intuition of "procedural rationality" as the decision is the output of a reasoning process addressed to respond to the decision maker's limited knowledge of the alternatives (Simon 1972) . The procedure of deliberation contains many steps in order to decide whether:
•each state ω i belongs to the set of situations (call it 'event E1' ) to which NBS does apply;
• the same state ω i belongs to the set of situations in which, assuming that B chooses a*, then the outcome is efficient/fair (call it 'event E2').
• given any ω i , the permissible actions is a* or a C .
First a better understanding of the event E1 is needed. Let Γ be the game that I have just described in sec.2 and 3, and let Gc be the codification for the conditions required for a game can be treated as one element of the class of cooperative bargaining games with fair status quo. E1 stands for the set of states where it is (at least vaguely) true that 'Γis a Gc'.
More precisely, E1 is understood as the set theoretic counterpart of a sentence resulting from the conjunction of the two following properties expressed in the language of our game Γ:
I.
The return Q has the nature (regardless of the extent) of a cooperative benefit;
II. Each player's specific investment cost (plus the effort cost in the case of player A) coincides with his fair status quo.
To begin with (i), define a return being the cooperative benefit produced by the two players through their specific investments as follows 
In order to decide whether to treat any state ω i 'as if' it were a situations to which Nash's solution must be applied, now let introduce an α-cut set. α must be understood as a vagueness threshold discriminating the states in which the game Γ sufficiently satisfies the conditions for being a Gc, from the remaining states.
For α = 0.5 define
This condition can be stated ex ante, so as to commit player B to treat the game as the appropriate domain of application of NBS whenever an unforeseen state were to belong to E1 at least up to degree 0.5.
Moreover its fulfilment can be checked ex post, when the players are also able to establish which of the ex ante unforeseen states exceed the ethical threshold of admissibility, simply by calculating the crisp (non fuzzy) set
For example, ex post the players may learn about Ω and, given the imprecise knowledge on each ω i due to its unexpected features, they generate the following fuzzy set The crisp set E1 0.5 = {ω 2 , ω 3 , ω 5 } is the 'admissible' set of states, and the players are allowed to conclude by default that NBS is applicable to it. The important implication is that commitments can be undertaken and verified on this basis:
•Ex ante B undertakes the commitment to treat the game as the domain of application of NBS in case any state ω i should come out, which ex post falls into the 'admissible'α− cut set E1 0.5 . •Ex post players learn the degree of me mbership of each state ω i in the set E1 and determine without any ambiguity whether NBS has effectively to be applied according to the above stated condition.
This fuzzy information can be used by each players in the role of A in order to check whether player B treat any stage-game under consideration appropriately. This is not enough however to define B's commitments to use particular actions a∈a.
Second Step in the Ethical Procedure of Deliberation: Fuzzy Measures of Surplus and Effort
Consider a subset of E1 α and call it event E2. By E2 we mean that 'the level of cooperative benefit R* j associate to the observable return Q and the player's A level of effort o Aj are such that the outcome is efficient/fair in the sense of NBS, if the action a* is chosen'. To define the event E2 in set theoretic terms, we must consider actions contingent on states (a*|ω i ). Thus, event E2 is defined as the set of states where the conjunction of any two properties R* j and o Aj necessarily implies that NBS, defined on the cooperative payoff space R* and the fair status quo D* (containing the given o Aj ), is maximised if action a* is chosen when any of such states occurs. That is, for h = A,B, and N levels of possible cooperative return R j and possible effort cost o Aj ,
where R j * and o Aj are the levels of cooperative benefit and of player's A effort cost occurring in state ω i . Moreover the NBS is defined by player's h utility function u h ranging over the possible allocations of the cooperative benefit R* j calculated through the distribution function f a (R* j ) associated to action a* such that, for utilities linear in the monetary payoffs, The possibility that any (a*|ω i ) has an efficient/fair outcome depends on some proportion between the size of the cooperative return R* j , (i.e. the extent of R*), and the size of effort o Aj associate to the task a* in state ω i . Players however, when any ω i ∈Ω occurs, do not see clearly R* j and o Aj but their observable substitutes Q and Z, and they remain in a condition of vagueness about the meaning of these two pieces of information in terms of the relevant variable R* and o A . Thus they proceed by considering separately the two pieces of vague information before being able to compound them in order to evaluate whether and how any given ω i belongs to E2.
The first component of vagueness of event E2 is indeterminacy of the causal relationship that links any size of return Q (i.e. Q i ∈[0, n]) to any size of the cooperative surplus R* j . In fact, whatever the level of cooperative benefit R* j considered, the set of the observable returns Q (i.e. states ω i ∈Ω exhibiting a level of Q i each) compatible with the given level of cooperative benefit, is a fuzzy set.
• Each interval of benefit defines therefore a fuzzy set of states. An example of the fuzzy sets defined by the various intervals of vague cooperative benefit is given in fig. 2 . . Each state, characterised by a specified observable ex post return Q i , is associated to every class of fuzzy cooperative benefit Fig. 2 represents a situation in which we know that substantial part of the return is a cooperative benefit, but its extent is vague. Vagueness is delimited by logical incompatibility between certain levels of observable return and certain sizes of cooperative benefit. On the contrary vagueness increases as the size of observable returns exceeds the given level of cooperative benefit, so that other sizes become more compatible with the observed ones. In fact, when the observable return is between 0 and 6 there is no vagueness that cooperative benefit must lies in the interval R* − − . But when the observable return becomes larger the case becomes more and more vague as other sizes of R* seem more possible. At the same time a very large size like R* ++ is incompatible to nearly all the levels of observable return, but it vagueness is at minimum when the return is very similar to the required value of R*.
The second component of vagueness of E2 is the meaning of the variable Z in terms of o A . Z is a description of a* in physical terms (hours required to carry out the task). But in order to understand whether and how a state belongs to the event E2 it is necessary to translate the value of Z into a measure of A's effort cost o A (the tiredness or enjoyment experienced by A out of any action a). This evaluation is inevitably vague, because of the novelty of events occurring in ω i , some of which may translate a high value of Z into a low effort-cost or, on the contrary, a low value of Z into a high effort-cost.
• Example 2. Let us consider as in section 2 only three possible value of effort-cost for a*
These value are immaterial per se, and can be taken as numerical exemplification for 'high', 'medium'
and 'low' effort-cost of a given task. However taking specified, even if arbitrary, numbers for the effortcost entering the utility functions of the players will make later possible the computation of NBS.
Moreover take as given a value of Z (say Z = 8 hours), in order to exemplify how the same value of Z may mean different levels of effort-costs. In fig.3 fuzzy membership functions are understood as expressing the possibility that, given the value of Z, in each of the states of the world (consider three of these) it happens that A must face each of the possible effort levels.
0.2 0.1 Fig. 3 . Each state, characterized by the same value of Z, is associated to every level of fuzzy effort-cost)
The example presents the case of three states that are inversely related to the three levels of player's A effort. Take ω 1 first. This is a state where some unexpected features make the task very hard, so that it is quite clear that the effort spent is high, whereas it is much more vague that it is low. On the contrary, in state ω 3 occurs some unexpected change that makes very easy the task, so that it is quite clear that effort is low, whereas it is much more vague that the effort requested is high.
Examples 1 and 2 illustrate how the pieces of information Q and Z, which are foreseeable ex ante and are observable ex post, may give only vague knowledge about the relevant variables for evaluating whether in a given state the action a* satisfies the event E2. This vague knowledge concerning any level j th of cooperative return R* j and player's A effort o Aj can be summarised by the corresponding fuzzy sets
Vagueness of Efficient/Fair Outcomes: Third Step in the Ethical Procedure of Deliberation
How the two components of vagueness mentioned above must be combined in order to express an 
whose membership functions are calculated as follows
This establishes how vague it is that in any given unforeseen state the conjunction of the two 
We call this fuzzy set event E2. Intuitively E2 is the union of all the situations such that choosing a* under any of them satisfies the NBS, i.e. it is the event that NBS is satisfied (up to some degree) by choosing a*. Thus we see that the proper notation for the above -mentioned event E2 is the fuzzy set E2 . 
Having this definition at hand, we are now able to work out formal conditions for committing player B to carry out action a* whenever doing that in an unforeseen state satisfies NBS at the appropriate level.
Within E1 α , the set E2 β is defined as the β-cut set of those states (unknown ex ante) whose grade of membership to the event E2 is not lower than threshold β = 0.5
Membership in this set is defined by the non-fuzzy membership function
We therefore have a criterion for saying in which states the action a* must be considered admissible, or be treated 'as if' it were efficient/fair. This criterion may be announced ex ante and meant as the basis for committing B in face of the expected ambiguity of the relevant information under unforeseen states.
Moreover it can be verified ex post as the membership functions take their values when the unforeseen states take place in practice.
Default Inference of Admissible Actions
Let π be an evaluation function of actions, with domain the set {admissible, inadmissible} and codomain B's conditional choice set, i.e. actions conditional upon states of the world. Take the rule of
This rule is basically needed in order to define commitments conditional upon the occurrence of unforeseen states of the world, which may be undertaken ex ante and can be verified ex post, as far as vagueness concerning the satisfaction of a given solution concept does not exceeds a given threshold.
The above scheme of inference is worked out by analogy with what in AI literature is called default reasoning (Reiter 1980 , Ginsberg 1987 . A statement is allowed among the default conclusions of a theory when it follows from the base of knowledge plus the rule of inference about the "normal course"
of the relevant matter. Even though there is no proof that these statements are true, nevertheless they are added to the base of knowledge only because they are consistent in the simple sense that no refutations of them at moment are known. Reiter (1980) by defaults means rules of inference like syllogisms, which extend the set of statements proved under a given theory and knowledge base by adding to them new statements derived through the application of default rules onto the basic set of statements of the theory and its default consequences. Given a incomplete collection of fact over the world, defaults are a way to "complete" our belief system on the world by inferring what it is allowed by basic beliefs (justified by our knowledge base) plus a set of "reasonable" conditionals that cannot be falsified given our incomplete knowledge. Typical default rules have the following form
where A(x) is a precondition to the rule belonging to the knowledge base, MA(x) → B(x) is the conditional clause that is checked for consistency with the existing base of knowledge (and is assumed by default) and B(x) is a consequence that is added to the base of justified beliefs if the clause is "consistent". According to the coherence interpretation of default logic (Reiter 1980) , in fact the modal operator M means "it is consistent to assume that…" and clause MA→ B can be interpreted as follows:
"in the absence of proof to the contrary it is coherent to assume that A→ B …". M can also be understood as "normally…" or "according to our best knowledge of the matter, it is reasonable to think that…".
Default rules of inference permit to add more sentences to our base of knowledge and beliefs by assuming that any conditional is acceptable whenever we have an incomplete collection of positive examples of it and we have not a constructive proof of the contrary to the conditional itself ensuing from the knowledge base. In absence of a refutation, notwithstanding that we do not have a conclusive proof of its truth but only some positive examples, we are permitted to assume the conditional sentence as part of the premises of an inference rule. By using the sentences of a knowledge base -a theory -as major premises of a syllogism, and by adding to them default conditionals, then we derive new conclusions that adds to the theory. In other words, as far as a proof of the contrary doesn't result, the "consistent" clause put together with the base knowledge allows to derive statements which shall constitute extensions of the basic theory. Of course default reasoning is non-monotonic and its conclusions are defeasible: as more information come out, some conclusion can be retracted in order to account for new information (McDermott and Doyle 1980) .
This is illustrated by the typical example about Tweety the penguin: in this case A(x) stands for
Bird(x), B(x) for Fly(x), and it is part of our knowledge base that x (Tweety) being a penguin is also a bird. Read M as 'it is consistent that...', so that the conditional M(A(x)→B(x)) represents that there is at the moment no evidence that contradicts that birds fly -i.e. "normally" birds fly. The result is a default inference that allows concluding that the Tweety flies (even if Tweety is a penguin), which eventually will prove to be false and clearly reveals that the system of beliefs is non-monotonic.
There is a basic analogy between default reasoning and the rule given above for evaluating actions under unforeseen contingencies. The fuzzy-based inference establishes the admissibility of an act in a state if we do not have proof of the incompatibility (this would amount to say that µ E2β (ω i ) = 0) between an unforeseen state of the world and a proposition of our base theory. The statement about the admissible action then follows, even though it remains vague under the current state whether the action fits the solution theory (we only ask that vagueness does not exceeds a given threshold.)
Let illustrate more in detail the default inference rule applicable to our case:
Premises 1 and 4 are sentences of our knowledge base, that is statements belonging to our solution theory such that "every game Γ that we may qualify as having the characteristics of a bargaining cooperative game Gc is solved according to NBS -where the symbol Σ means 'solution' " and "if the state is such as an action satisfies the conditions for an efficient/fair outcome in the sense of NBS, then that action is admissible". Premises 2 and 3 are typical default reasoning conditionals, based on consistency. The first says that it is consistent with our knowledge to take the game Γ 'as if' it were a Gc in the state ω i given that the "degree of clarity" in the membership of ω i to E1 is no less than α. The second says that it is consistent to assume that action a* satisfies NBS in the state ω i given that the "degree of clarity" in the membership of ω i to E2 is no less than β. All that is assumed in so far as it does not contradict the information at disposal of the players. As far as any state ω i belongs to the events E1 α and E2 β , it follows that there is no reason to believe that the two properties are not true in that states (More on the relationship between default logic and fuzzy logic in Sacconi and Moretti (2002)).
Back to Reputation Effects
We now are ready for developing a reputation game model under unforeseen contingencies. The game defined in section 2 now simply becomes the stage-game (called a play) of a repeated game. The stagegame is played repeatedly by the long-run player B against an infinite series of short-run players playing each for a single period (from now on I shall refer to them as player A i on the basis of their index of entry i). Thus the strategies of the long-run player B for the repeated game will become rules which establish his choice between a* and a C for each play, contingently on the previous history of the game up to the present play. Each A i will decide from the standpoint of the stage game in which he is taking part, whether to enter or not (e or non-e) contingently on the previous history. In more general terms let h t be an history of the repeated game where t is the number of repetitions of a stage game which has been played up to repetition t. Each history describes one possible sequence of actions the long-run player and the various short-run players may have taken up to repetition t. We can then define the set of possible histories of the game up to repetition t by H t . A strategy of the long-run player B then is defined as a function that for each history h t ∈ H t determines which action of the stage game will be used by the longrun player from repetition t+1 on, where t has any value (from 1 to infinity). Obviously, since a short run player A i participates in a single repetition of the stage game, an A i 's strategy will be a function that, for all the possible histories of the game up to the repetition before the one he takes part in, determines the action A i will choose in the current stage game. The length of the history of which the short-run player's A i action is a function obviously depends on the point at which the player enters the game.
Since a short-run player's A i payoff depends only on the stage game he takes part in, each A i is interested in the outcome of that game only. He is thus short-sighted and tries to predict only the action the long-run player will take in the game he is involved in, ignoring any predictions about the further development of the game. The long-run player, on the other hand, has a payoff function which is built up as the infinite sum of the payoffs received from all the stage games; the payoff received from each stage enters into the sum multiplied times a discount rate which is 1 at the first repetition and δ (between 0 and 1) at the second repetition, δ 2 at the third, δ 3 at the fourth and so on. The discount rate is the value the long-run player attaches to future utility or, if you like, his "impatience" level. Unless his impatience makes him to evaluate positively only payoffs gained from the nearest repetitions, the long-run player is far-sighted, in that he is interested in predicting how the various future short-run players will act.
Consequently his game strategy is chosen not only in order to produce a result in the current stage game, but also according to the effect this strategy will have on the short-sighted behaviour of the short-run players in any further repetition.
Games like this, but defined in the more traditional context of foreseen contingencies, have been studied by Levine (1989, 1991 ) (see also Fudenberg and Tirole 1991) . The basic request for reputation effects can be put at work in this kind of games is that ex post any A i must be able to check whether B conforms to his commitments or not. In order to see how this is so in our repeated game under unforeseen contingencies, let define player's B types (which correspond to player's B commitments).
Quite unconventionally, each type is not associated to the performance of an idiosyncratic act, but to the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of the conditions ex ante laid down by the code. Let's assume that there are three types of player B Type θ1 takes on the commitment to follow the ethical code in each play.
Type θ2 always adopts a* -his dominant action -in each state of the world θ 2 = ∀ω i , (a*|ω i )
Type θ3 makes his choice somewhat at 'random' (a C |ω i ) with prob 0.25, ∀ω i such that (a*|ω i ) is inadmissible
The code signals the possibility of a type, but compliance with the code depends on reputation effects.
In order the mechanism of reputation to be put at work, all that must be added is that the prior probability assigned to the type θ 1 -who respects the code -should not be zero (plus the hypothesis that player B is not short-sighted). Assume prior probabilities of the types are as follows:
where p can be very small and 1-p =q+r. small The updating rule is Bayesian. 5 Read (a C ∩ω i θ 1 ) as 'the occurrence of the action a C in the state w i given that player B is the type θ 1 '. Likelihood functions of actions, for each state of the world given each type, are the following.
In the case of the type θ 1 :
In the case of the type θ 2 :
In the case of the type θ 3 :
Note that learning is allowed only when the code establishes (a*|ω i ) = inadmissible.
The conditional probability of types, given the act undertaken in the preceding stage game, with reference to each state of the world ω i is calculated by Bayes rule. 5 For example in the case of type θ 1 p(a c ∩ω i |θ 1 ) p(θ 1 ) p(θ 1 |ω i ∩a c ) =  ∑ 3 j=1 p(a c ∩ω i |θ j ) p(θ j )
If player B chooses a* in a state in which the code establishes the inadmissibility of a*, then the conditional probability of type θ 1 is nil. After enough (say n) observations of a C , in states in which the code requires it, the conditional probability of type θ1 increases to the extent that decision to enter (e) becomes appealing for each A n+1 .
Fudenberg and Levine's results (1988, 1991) guarantee that in games like this, for a discount rate δ~1, the upper bound of the equilibrium set is given by an equilibrium that, except for an initial period of N plays, gives the long-run player the stage game Stackelberg's payoff for the whole duration of the repeated game. Hence, take the ex post perspective, when Ω has been revealed, and consider the subset of Ω of those states ω i ∈E1 α such that a* does not maximise NBS, but nevertheless the player's A payoff remains positive. To keep calculations simple, I assume that the probability mass over such subset of unforeseen states measures zero. This amount to say that unforeseen states which are similar to the foreseen states w 3 of fig. 1 (where even if player B will disobey the code, entering is nevertheless optimal to player A) will have practically null probability. Thus, in any state ω i that we need to take care of, if a* is incompatible to NBS then the Stackelberg payoff in pure strategies to player B will be certainly given I only give here a sketch of the proof, as a more detailed one would be essentially analogous to (Fudenberg and Levine 1989 ). An important difference is however the adaptation of that results to the completely new context of unforeseen states. This also implies that, as it will be clear in a moment, my proof can not be so clear cut as those in the reputation games literature are. Let N be the number of plays that players A i employ in order to update the probabilities of the types, until a probability distribution over the actions of B is generated that induces player A n+1 to enter. M < N is the number of plays in which the players A i effectively learn, given that sometimes (precisely N -M times) states may occur for which the code requires a*. Let us suppose that until now player B acted as if he were the type θ1, that is, he used a C in the M plays in which the code requires it. Given that players A i are rational, they will have refrained from playing e until the period N, but from the period N + 1 on they will begin to enter. To choose his best reply player B will compare the expected payoffs from at least two strategies: following periods however it has zero as expected continuation payoff (remember that the total probability of states where the A i 's dominant action in the stage game is e whenever B chooses his action a*, is assumed to be near to zero). After N plays in which the payoff is zero, strategy s1 obtains in each play of the remaining infinite continuation game, in which the ethical code requires the action a C , the expected payoff of a C calculated over the set of possible states in which a* is inadmissible. This must be multiplied times their probability (it should be remembered that, according to the hypothesis on the probability of states, payer B predicts that in none of the remaining plays will a state occur which, according to the ethical code, requires the adoption of the action a*). Therefore s1 dominates s2 simply if the continuation expected payoff of s2 counterbalances the single occasion on which s2 offers the payoff of the pair (e, a*). For δ ~ 1, the strategy s1 dominates B's strategy s2, since it allows B to obtain an identical payoff in the N initial plays and a higher payoff in every plays after N except one, while the adva ntage that can be obtained from s2 in that unique play is more than counterbalanced by the series of higher discounted continuation payoffs .
Next, consider that starting from the play N+1, player B chooses to simulate his type θ3. Hence, he chooses a C with probability 0.25 when the code declares that a* is not admissible, and a* otherwise -i.e.
he chooses a* 3/4 of the times the code does not allow it. After some players A i have seen B for a number of times playing both a C and a* against what required by types θ1 and θ2, they will eventually become convinced that player B is in fact type θ3 (to be sure, under a simple Bayesian model even a single alternation of a C , when requested, and a* when not allowed, should convince each A i that θ1 and θ2 are both false.) Thus they will believe that thereafter the code will be complied with only up to probability 0.25 when it requires choosing action a C . Remember the we have assumed that only states are positively probable such that whether the code asks for a C then choosing a* implies a negative payoff to the current player A i . Thus there is no reason to believe that by developing a reputation of being θ3 player B will be able in general to induce generic players A i to enter the hierarchical relationship. Although sometimes the contrary will be true, in general having the reputation of being type θ3 will imply that player B offers to each player A i , in exchange for entering when the code asks for a C , an expected payoff less than 0.
Consequently, he must in general entertain the expectation of a zero continuation payoff after the first time he has played a* when the code asked for a C , plus some gain reaped in cases that player A i will unpredictably enter. Notice that states such that the type's θ3 strategy happens to be able inducing entrance by any player A i , are unforeseen. Given that ex ante player B can not predict the case nor the number of times this fortunate contingency will materialise -i.e. the cases when 0.75 probability of a negative payoff will be counterbalanced by 0.25 probability of a positive one -he can not carryout the calculation of the discounted expected payoff of the strategy that simulates type θ3. In general this means that it is not possible to adjust ex ante the probabilities of the mixed strategy type to the particular payoff structure which will be revealed under each unforeseen state. The mixed strategy type thus degenerates to a idiosyncratic deviation from the pure strategy types' behaviour, and can not be seen as a type that player B may strategically simulate in order to adapt his behaviour to players' A i incentive to enter along the future repetitions of the game under unforeseen contingencies. Simulating type θ3 is a strategy with outcomes that are not ex ante under the player's B rational control (he can not say whether the unpredictable cases in which it will induce A i to enter will balance the most times in which it will induce A i to stay out.) Thus, we may only conclude that simulating type θ3 is not a rationally calculated player's B best reply to the behaviour of the players A i who decide to enter after the first N periods, as compared to the strategy s1, which assures an infinite series of positive NBS maximising payoffs.
Fudenberg and Levine's theorems states that, for a discount level of future payoffs δ ~ 1, there exists an equilibrium of the repeated game that, except for an initial period of N plays, gives a long-run player like B the stage game Stackelberg's payoff for the whole remaining duration of the repeated game and this is the equilibrium which offers the long-run player the highest equilibrium total payoff. In our less predictable context for the most of plays in which a C is required by the code, the Stackelberg's payoff 
Discussion
It may be argued that the main result of the paper (proposition II) rests too heavily upon the choice of the set of possible types, and the "mixed strategy" types in particular.
6 In fact I introduced only type θ3 as a representative for these types essentially for two reasons. First, at least one mixed strategy type was needed in order not to let the probabilities of pure types to change too dramatically after the single evidence of a choice by player B which were inc onsistent with the hypothesis that player B is one of the two pure types. Note that this could be the case after a very few plays from the beginning of the game.
Lacking any mixed strategy type, one single evidence of the choice a C made by player B, when the code requires it, would falsify type θ2, and would imply probability one assigned to the type θ1. Type θ3 allows some learning dynamics to be associated to the emergence of the beliefs that induce players A i playing "enter".
Second, it seems reasonable to assume that Player B may undergo idiosyncratic random mistakes in acting according to a pure type, so that he occasionally may act against his prevailing rule of behaviour.
Thus acts that conform to the code can sometimes be carried out also by a player that normally does not conform to it. Assuming that there is a typical disposition to mistake the player's own conscious commitment, we may introduce thi s kind of disposition as a further "type" of the player B. One example of it is our type θ3. This would also justify the introduction of a mixed strategy type who randomly makes mistakes in complying with the code. For simplicity I skip this hypothesis, but of course it should be kept in mind that a type who mistakes full compliance with small probability would nevertheless induce after some plays players A i to enter. As a consequence player B should optimally simulate exactly this type, for it gives him higher payoffs than a type of perfect compliance. Hence, a first limitation to proposition II is that, under the hypothesis of random mistakes of the type conforming to the code, the upper bound of the equilibrium set in the repeated game would be given instead by a strategy of the long run player that tolerates small random deviations from the code without inducing the players A i to stay out.
However, in my model there is no room for types that would express the player's B ability to perform a fine tuning of the probability mixtures with respect to each situation -such that the players A i are induced to enter, while nevertheless player B can retain almost all the rent at stake. This would ask for types whose mixed strategy perfectly fits the expected utility of any player A i in each state of the world, which is clearly not the case in our context. True, in the classical context of reputation games "mixed strategy" types should be more widely accounted for. Take Assume the one-shot game is a Stackelberg game where B can undertake binding commitments also on mixed strategies. Hence, consider player's B mixed strategy (2/3, 1/3), where the first component is the probability assigned to the action of abusing player's A trust, whereas the second component is the probability of not abusing. This strategy makes player A indifferent between his pure or mixed strategies.
His natural best response then is the mixed strategy (½, ½), where the first component is the probability assigned to entering and the second the probability assigned to stay out. It gives the expected payoff 0 to A, but allows player B an expected payoff 1.32. Moreover it suggests that in a Stackelberg model with the given values of parameters, where B were able to endorse genuine binding commitments on mixed strategies, player B could improve his outcome over the pure Stackelberg equilibrium strategy, simply by resorting to a commitment on the mixed strategy (2/3-ε, 1/3+ε) (with ε as small as possible.) It gives in fact player B the expected payoff 2.64-ε, while leaving A the expected positive payoff 4ε. That is the Stackelberg payoff of the game with mixed strategy commitments is associated to the player's B commitment to this mixed strategy, which allows him to abuse A as far as this does not induce A to stay out. This would also translate in a different upper bound of the equilibrium set of the repeated trust game.
Assume that the just quoted mixed strategy type is deemed possible by the players. If the long run player develops the reputation of being the (2/3, 1/3) type, why should not he adapt even more the probabilities of his strategy mixture by playing in the long run "non abuse" a little bit more in order to induce all the player A i entering from a certain play on?
It is an open question, however, whether this reasoning format can account for ethical commitments, like being the kind of players who conforms to a code of ethics. What does it mean to develop the commitment to comply with a code "only one third of the times"? Notice that we do not ask a question about a policy for enforcing the code, but concerning the very nature, character or identity of the player itself. It can well be the case that the only efficient policy of enforcement for a committed public authority is to inspect and possibly punish transgressors only one third of the days at random, nevertheless this would continue to be the behaviour associated to a type completely committed. Our question on the contrary is whether we can understand the very idea of an authority committed to a code only one third, and not committed two third. I guess that anybody would say that this actor is simply not committed at all.
The reason for skipping nearly uniform mixtures of the two pure strategies is that types must represent commitments. Player A sees B as a player sticking to the rule of behaviour derived from the "rational" solution of the stage-game, or nearly so, but also admits on the other hand that he may be committed to the code, or nearly so. While these rules of behaviour are understandable "commitments", it seems to me a "non sense" the utterance that "player B is committed to act x with nearly the same probability as not acting x" or worse -to say -with probability (2/3, 1/3). This should be better understood as avoiding of committing oneself at all and remaining free to act arbitrarily.
These consideration can however be put aside when we leave the standard context of games of reputation and reach the new context of games under unforeseen contingencies. The reasoning underlying the adoption of the fine tuned mixed strategies is simply unrealistic under incomplete and vague knowledge. Consider the player B who, having developed a reputation of being the type (2/3, 1/3), plans to play a little bit more the code in order to induce a correction of players' A i beliefs which later on will push them to enter every times. This move presupposes to be able calibrating the probability mixture in the light of the expected payoffs that any player A i will face later on under any contingencies. Under unforeseen contingencies this is a knowledge the players may have only ex post, and even ex post lot of fuzziness will remain about the exact meaning of the monetary payoffs. However, in order to develop reputations in a repeated game under unforeseen contingencies commitment s (i.e. "types") must be established ex ante and must be announced unconditionally with respect to any specific description of the unforeseen states of the world. This was the very bulk of my construction of the code as a deliberative procedure able of generating expectations of players that are aware of their incomplete knowledge of states, but nevertheless not even capable to imagine further descriptions of the possible states. On the other hand, before knowing the current possible states there is no basis for calculating the mixed strategy that renders each player A i indifferent between his two pure strategies. If mixed types must the established ex ante, there is no room to tailor them as perfectly fitting the players payoffs in each ex post states. For example, if before knowing that states will emerge in which the A i payoffs are not in the proportion -1:2, the type (2/3-ε, 1/3+ε) were ex ante adopted, ex post this mixed strategy type would not be able to induce players A i to enter. Summing up, I do not see an alternative to assume that the mixed strategy types are only idiosyncratic deviations from pure types, not ex ante tailored to the specific numerical payoffs the players will obtain in each state of the world.
Limitations and Final Remarks
There are other two apparently limiting assumptions implicit in my result. First, it is assumed that two agents A i and A i+1 who participate consecutively in the repeated game, must share the same judgement regarding the observed action a*. When a state that was not specified ex ante occurs, their judgement regarding the compatibility of the state with the two conditions of admissibility must be the same, that is to say the vagueness of the relationship between the state and the two events E1 and E2 must be measured identically by the two players. This assumption is assured by interpreting vagueness as objective indeterminacy or as vague knowledge, but not as subjective belief. It should be noted that both vague knowl edge and subjective belief (subjective probability) intervene, but at very distinct points of the argument: when the state ω i occurs, its compatibility with the events E1 and E2 is the subject of vague evaluation but inter-subjectively invariable. Since the code contains a default rule of inference, the judgement about the admissibility of the action a* observed ex post is neither vague nor uncertain, but univocal although not monotonic. If the action in such circumstances is inadmissible B's behaviour appears to incompatible with the hypothesis that he is a type who respects the code. Only at this point does probability come into play: each A i and A i+1 will have an initial belief expressed via a subjective prior probability distribution regarding the types of B. The type is established without any vagueness, since it coincides with the behaviour prescribed by the default inference or its negation. Each pure type (i.e the ethical and the non-ethical) chooses a* when the conditions regarding the membership of states in the sets E1 α and E2 β are respectively (1,1) or (1,0). Then, the probability of all the type varies according to the evidence collected ex post via likelihood functions.
Second, in order that B may be able to foresee and anticipate the evolution in the beliefs of the other players, it is necessary that B comes to the same vague judgement as they do regarding the compatibility of the state known ex post with the events E1 and E2. What is required is not necessarily that B has at the beginning the same piece of information and therefore expresses the same judgement about the compatibility between the states and the sets E1 and E2. What is required is simply that B should have access to the common judgements expressed by A i and A i+1 , since it is from these judgements that A i and A i+1 's short-run behaviour derives. Therefore the only relevant thing is the vague judgement in the state of information shared by A i and A i+1 .
Notice that strong assumptions such as the existence of a common distribution of fuzziness, or -worst -that it is common knowledge, are not necessary. What is really needed is much less than this: only any couple of players A i and A i+1 must share the same fuzziness distribution on the unforeseen states, which have already transpired when they participate in the game. This same distribution must be also known by B at stage i and i+1, without asking however that B agrees on it being an accurate representation of the vagueness at hand. On the other hand, player B has strong reasons for employing it when he is implementing the rules of the code. In fact, only if his behaviour conforms to what the code asks him, in the light of how things are seen by any couple of players A i , A i+1 , he will benefit from the reputation effects that induce those players, participating in the stage games in the role of A, to "enter". To put it in other words, it is in B's best interest to take the fuzziness distribution assigned by any couple A i and A i+1 for granted, in order to maintain the reputation effects mechanism at work. In this sense NBS may seem at this point an exogenous principle superimposed to the game under consideration. Of course our aim is making endogenous the principle by showing that this hypothetical reasoning can be supported by effective reputation effects that assures B will effectively carry out his commitments in the non cooperative game. 3 According to Richard Hare (Hare 1981) statements of ethics are universalisable. Hypothesize to have a statement where some characteristics, carrying the moral value, are attributed to certain individual objects. Next replace all the individual object s with other individual objects that are completely new except for being in a similar relationship to the morally significant characteristics. Then the new statement must retain the same normative meaning as the original one. Of course the meaning is primarily normative, but the relevant characteristics, carrying the normative value, have also a descriptive content so that every time we find these characteristics in a situation where they are in the appropriate (analogous) relation to any individual objects, we also must have the same normative judgment. These descriptive characteristics, carrying the normative value, are the initial condition for applying the normative concept of solution to whom we refer in the text. 4 At first sight fuzzy set theory presents us with an approach linked to the old idea that the set of states Ω is univocally determined, by means of a partition into mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive states: we have a reference set which is clear cut. This would seem to leave no space for the idea of incomplete or imprecise knowledge of the basic possible alternatives. Nevertheless the fuzzy sets, insofar as they are subsets of Ω, introduce exactly this characterisation into the representation of the knowledge of the agents. A fuzzy set E, to which a state ω i 'imperfectly' belongs, means that that state is 'imperfectly' characterised as regards the property stated by the sentence corresponding to the event. Thus the d escription of the alternative states offered by Ω must not be the precise and exhaustive description of every characteristic that can be expressed using the resources of our language: we are not precise or univocal about the attribution of many characteristics to alternative states of the world (so that we cannot say that their description is devoid of ambiguity). Each ω i represents a conjunction of the affirmation (or negation) of all the properties that can be expressed in language about any individual variables, but for many of these our 'state of the world' is not at all a precise and unambiguous description; in many ways it affirms that a given property is satisfied in that state only to a certain degree. 5 Introducing probabilities of unforeseen states of the world would ask for a clarification about the meaning of prior probability of states that ex ante were unforeseen, i.e. were non included within the states space. I leave this question to a further discussion. However see (Sacconi 2000, pp. 207-8) . 6 I am indebted to Luciano Andreozzi (private communication, see also Andreozzi (2002)) for this and the following critical remarks concerning the matter of "mixed strategy types" both in the one-shot and in the repeated trust game. Although they seem quite relevant to the standard case of games under foreseen contingencies, my reluctance to give wider space to mixed strategy types in my model depends on the fact that my main aim is to extend the reputation games technique to an epistemic context (unforeseen contingencies) in which the fine tuning of the probability mixture of pure strategies within the commitments devised by the Leader, in order to produce the desired response by Followers, is debarred by the fact itself that the game is played under incomplete knowledge.
Notes
